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This thesis applies the state of the art techniques for
methodical design of secure operating systems to a
distributed, multi-microprocessor environment. Explicit
process structure and utilization of virtual environments
are the fundamental concepts that form a basis for the
design presented. The primary design techniques utilized in
the design are segmentation, distributed operating system,
security kernel, multiprocessing, "cache" memory strategy
and multiprogramming. The resulting design is for a family
of distributed operating systems that can provide the power
of yesterdays large computer in a microprocessor
environment. Security, configuration independence, and a
loop free structure are the primary characteristics of the
design. The design, although hardware independent, was
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The microprocessors available today are affordable and
powerful computing devices. Applying these resources to
various applications, especially those requiring multiple
microprocessors, presents a formidable problem. The solution
to this problem is a family of operating systems to
effectively orchestrate processor and memory management
across a wide range of applications. However, such systems
have not come from the specialized microprocessor operating
systems in use today. Such an operating system family could
provide a major reduction of overall system software cost in
the microprocessor environment.
In this thesis the substantial body of operating system
design principles are applied to a methodical design of an
operating system for the microprocessor environment. For
realism the Zilog Z8000 microprocessor [l] is considered
representative of modern features. Configuration
independence, distributed processing, multiple protection
domains, multiprocessing and multiprogramming are addressed
in the design of a secure operating system suitable for a
family of operating systems: ranging from a specialized
tactical system to a multi-user time sharing system.
The thesis will also identify meaningful subsets of the
design (viz., smaller members of the family) for potential
use, and state hardware needed (future development) to

implement the design to its fullest capabilities. The
operating system designed in this thesis will he referred to
as the SYSTEM throughout the thesis.
A. MOTIVATION
The processing power of microprocessors is increasing.
If this power could he effectively coordinated by an
operating system it could provide a more affordable and
powerful product. In addition, there is a growing emphasis
on the protection of information stored and processed in
computers; hence, the requirement for a system that also
provides information security.
The multi-microprocessor systems in use today suffer
performance degradation as more processors (generally a
maximum of 4 to 5) are added to the system. Sophisticated
crossbar interconnections between processors and memories
can reduce this problem. However, there is still a need for
a combination of microprocessors and memory that do not
suffer massive degradation as more processors are added.
The ability to configure a system to meet a variety of
capacity needs is an important feature; however as software
becomes an increasing portion of system cost, the ability to
reconfigure the system as requirements change without major
re-design effort is often an even more valuable feature. For
this reason the design technique of resource visualization




B. 3ASIC ELEMENTS OF DESIGN
The SYSTEM is composed of a supervisor and a security
Kernel [2]. The supervisor supports user services (dynamic
linking, discretionary security, demand memory management
and a hierarchical file system). The security kernel
controls the physical system resources (processors, memory,
and external devices) to provide virtual resources for the
supervisor.
1. Process Structure
A process within the computer system is an internal
representation of the computational task of a user utilizing
the system. Each process is characterized by an execution
point and an address space. Attributes of each process
include a security class authorization and a unique
identifier that corresponds to the user. By supporting
distinct, explicit processes the operating system allows an
application to he divided into several cooperating parts.
Such a process structure leads to simpler more effective
software
.
2. Segmented Virtual Memory
Segmentation involves separating all stored
information into discrete packages called segments. Each
segment has attributes such as security class and access
(read or write) permissions. A process' address space is a
collection of segments. Segmentation is used by the
10

supervisor to present the user a random access virtual
memory. Copies of all segments are kept on secondary storage
until actually referenced, at which time room is made for it
in main memory, possibly by removing another segment from
memory. This demand memory management is done within the
supervisor. The supervisor views a non-random access virtual
memory. 3y presenting the supervisor and the user with
virtual environments the kernel establishes configuration
independence for them.
3. Distributed Operating System
The address space of each process has three domains
(user, supervisor and kernel). The domains form sub-sets of
the address space by limiting the segments that can be
accessed when the process' execution point is within a given
domain. The operating system is part of each process. It is
distributed throughout all the processes in protected
domains (supervisor domain and kernel domain). Maximum
access is in the kernel domain. It is the most priviledged,
and the traditional "privileged instruction' can be executed
only in the kernel domain. Only the kernel domain has access
to system wide data bases.
The kernel domain creates an extended machine for
the supervisor and is supported by system processes. The
supervisor is less priviledged but provides the user domain
with certain common services such as discretionary security
and virtual memory. It should be noted that by distributing
11

the operating system throughout all processes, services are




The operating system is designed to support a
multi-processor configuration with a local memory in close
proximity to each processor. The local memory is addressable
only by that processor. In addition there is a global memory
that is addressable by all processors (Figure 1).
Segmentation is the key to effective allocation of
information between local and global memory. Problems can
arise in the use of a local memory. If a process is allowed
to execute on any processor then each time the process is
switched from one processor to another the contents of local
memory must also be switched. Thus the use of local memory
implies that general multiprogramming should not be allowed.
This problem can be alleviated by allowing mult iprogrammed
processes to be semi-dedicated, that is make an effort to
restrict the process to a certain processor.
5. Security Kernel
Security cannot in general be built around a present
system (i.e., added to) but rather a system must be built
around security. let today there are a limited number of
"secure" systems. One of the main obstacles in providing


























developed security kernel [2] technology has made it possible
to solve this problem. By keeping all the things that
provide the security in the security kernel and keeping the
things that do not involve security out, the security kernel
can be kept relatively small and verifiable. The desire to
keep the security kernel small (to simplify the verification
procedure) is one of the goals driving several design
choices .
C. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
First, the fundamental concepts (process structure,
virtual memory and security) and their relationships to the
SYSTEM are discussed. Second, the design of the SYSTEM is
presented. This includes a discussion of the design
techniques utilized as well as an explanation of the





By dividing a job into asynchronous parts and executing
these parts as seperate entities significant "benefits can be
realized. Within a single processor system, the partitioning
into asynchronous parts provides 'only* design simplicity
(and thus software economy). In a multi-processor system the
partitioning into asynchronous parts is essential if the
parallel processing potential of the system is to be
realized
.
1 . Definition of a Process
A process is characterized by an execution point and
an address space. Saltzer[3] defines a process as a program
in execution on a pseudo-processor. Each process is assigned
a unique identifier and is an explicit entity that requires
management. In a distributed operating system, those
portions of the operating system that are logically part of
the sequential flow of control (viz., locus of execution)
are within the address space of the user process. This is
made possible by dividing the operating system into
procedures which are called like any other procedure. It
should be noted that in a distributed operating system there
is no 'master" assigning processes to processors. Rather,
each running process "hands off" its processor to the next
15

process that is to run.
2. Multiple Domains
To protect these procedures from the user, the
process' address space is divided into hierarchical domains:
user, supervisor, and kernel. The kernel domain is the most
privileged. Only the security kernel executes in this domain
and can access all segments within the address space. All
system wide data oases are restricted to access by the
security kernel to prevent any exchange of information
between processes, in violation of confinement [4] . There
could he more than three domains, and all domains n.eed not
he hierarchical, hut three is minimum for this design.
The supervisor domain is less priviledged and
excludes segments representating the management of the
shared resourses. The supervisor domain is separated from
the user to protect the user from inadverently destroying
the operating system services. The user domain is the least
priviledged. The data oases utilized oy the supervisor
contain only "process local" information - that is,
information that is required by this process alone.
Proper controls and checks are utilized when
switching the domains (flow of control) so that the security
policies are not violated. The hierarchy could be
implemented with rings [5] in hardware. Since hardware rings
are not available in microprocessors, separate segment
descriptors for each domain can be used, with software ring
16

changes as was done in the original Multics design[6] . The
Zilog Z802, f can use multiple memory management units (MMU)
to provide the separate descriptor for each domain.
Operating system procedures generally are permitted
to reside within the local memory (possibly ROM) of each
processor. In »the cases of the security kernel, some of the
data bases of these procedures are shared by all processors
and therefore will reside in global memory. To prevent
undesired intervention by simultaneous accesses to these
data bases a locking scheme must, of course, be provided.
Choosing to put the operating system procedures in each
local memory will "waste* memory but may well provide a
higher performance by keeping most memory references to
local memory where there is no contention for the BUS to
global memory. In a specific instance the choice will be
determined by whether or not the cost of memory is
significant when compared to the value of the increase in
perfo rmance.
3 . Communication and Synchronization
For parallel processing, a job that is composed of a
mixture of sequential and non-sequential tasks is explicitly
divided into an appropriate structure of processes that can
run concurrently. Inter-process communication and
synchronization are necessary for parallel processing.
Inter-process communication provides synchronization to
coordinate the exchange of data between processes. The
17

actual exchange is realized by use of a shared writable
segment. This segment acts like a mailbox in that messages
(data) can be delivered by any process that has the
appropriate access (both discretionary and
non-discretionary).
The synchronization between processes is supported
by the SLOCK and WAKEUP, which are kernel calls to the
traffic controller. It should be noted that the P and 1
semaphores [7] are useable for synchronization but were not
chosen. The traffic controller concept is taken from
Saltzer[3], and his block and wakeup have demonstrated their
usefulness in his design for Multics. The traffic controller
is the operating system (kernel) module that manages
processes. The traffic controller has the job of scheduling
user processes. The traffic controller does this by
multiplexing the users processes onto a limited number of
virtual processors.
The 3L0CK and WAKIUP are primitives of the traffic
controller that provide synchronization for the user
processes. How the user's procedures invoke the BLOCK and
WAKEUP primitives will, of course, determine the actual
process structure. These primitives can be used to provide
simple cooperation, such as mutual exclusion, or complex
interactions when required by the application. A process can
only block itself and cannot block another process. The
block invokes the traffic controller and the traffic
controller puts that process in the blocked state and then
13

schedules another process to run on that virtual processor.
The process that is scheduled next is based on the specific
scheduling policy of the traffic controller.
The wakeup is used to provide asynchronous processes
a synchronization signal. The parameter passed with the
wakeup is the process ID of the process for which the wakeup
is intended. The wakeup invokes the traffic controller. The
traffic controller checks the state of the process specified
by the parameter. If that process is not in the blocked
state the traffic controller returns, otherwise he will put
that process in the ready state and determine if there is
another process running with a lower priority. If this is
the case the traffic controller will send the virtual
processor that the lower priority process is running on a
pre-empt interupt, and then return. The process that
receives the pre-empt interupt will transfer control to the
traffic controller who will in turn schedule the ready
process with the highest priority.
Another SYSTEM module concerned with synchronization
is the inner traffic controller. This manages the hardware
(real) processors to create the virtual processors that are
managed by the traffic controller. The inner traffic
controller provides the interface between the virtual and
physical (real) processors. The inner traffic controller is
responsible for assigning the small, fixed number of virtual
processors to physical processors. Each physical processor
has associated with it several virtual processors. Some
19

virtual processors are multiplexed "between users processes
by the traffic controller. The remaining virtual processors
are allocated to the system processes. Each system process
is assigned a virtual processor. The inner traffic
controller determines which virtual processor will run on
the physical processor based on the priority assigned to
each virtual processor. The primitives SIGNAL and WAIT are
used by the inner traffic controller to provide
communication and synchronization between the virtual
processors. SIGNAL and WAIT are very similar in form and
function to 3L0CK and WAK3UP, except for the fact that they
relate to virtual processors rather than user processes.
4. System Processes
System processes are used to perform operating
system functions that are asynchronous to each user process.
System processes are typically responsible for the shared
resources. The system processes are in the kernel and
therefore permitted to access information of any access





Process switching is the removing and assigning of
processes to virtual processors. When a process switch
occurs the execution point (internal registers) and address
space of the process being removed must be saved (unloaded),
20

and then the execution point and address space of the new
process must "be loaded.
Some systems utilize a descriptor case register
(D3R) [6, p. 12] , which is a pointer to multiple descriptor
lists in memory - one list for each process. To change the
address space you only need to switch the D3R in the
physical processor. However, in microprocessor systems a
descriptor list is implemented as registers in the memory
management unit (MMU). Process switching can he costly when
MMU registers are saved and restored for each change in
address space. Alternatively, it is possible to increase the
number of MMUs and then the address space could be changed
by just switching control to another MMU".
B. SEGMENTED VIRTUAL MSMCRY
In many memory handling schemes a user process cannot
run until there is sufficient memory available to load its
entire address space. This requires large main memory and
restricts the size of the process's address space. An
alternative is to use the operating system to produce the
illusion of an extremely large memory. Since the large
memory is merely an illusion, it is called virtual memory.
Demand segmentation is a memory management scheme which is
used to realize the concept of virtual memory in this
design.
Memory has three different views which corresponds to
the three different domains (user, supervisor, kernel)
21

within the computer system. Starting with the user, each
view is derived from the previous view "by means of an
"extended machine" view. The user sees a practically
unlimited segmented virtual memory. The user is no longer
involved in memory management. Demand memory management is
utilized to interface between the user view and the
supervisor view.
The supervisor views a fixed amount of virtual memory.
The memory is fixed by the physical memory allocated to each
process by the kernel. The kernel establishes a mapping
between the supervisor memory and the kernel memory. The
memory is virtual because there are only absolute addresses
in the kernel. The supervisor multiplexes the user's
segments onto this fixed virtual memory in response to a
hardware fault when the process references a segment that is
not in memory. The demand memory management was placed in
the supervisor because it is not involved with security and
we want to keep the security kernel as simple and small as
possible .
The kernel views a fixed physical memory. The physical
memory is limited by the local memory available to the
processor for use by the user processes. There is some
minimum amount of memory required by the operating system
for each processor. Before a process is elgible to run, its
fixed virtual memory (of the supervisor) must be mapped into
the fixed physical memory of the processor. We then call the
process "loaded". The kernel's memory manager is responsible
22

for the proper mapping as the processes address spaces are
multiplexed onto the processor's physical memory.
The idea is to require that a limited amount of the job
be resident in memory. When the user requests a portion of
the process that is not currently in memory, a fault will
occur. The supervisor, using the demand memory manager, must
find the requested segment and decide where it wishes to
place the requested information in virtual memory. The
supervisor then sends a reauest to the kernel to bring this
information into memory, thereby repairing the fault so that
normal processing can resume.
1. Segmentation
In most micro systems, the user cannot effectively
share memory because the different uses of memory can not be
specified. The inability to specify the memory use makes
memory management difficult, especially when there is memory
local to each processor. The different uses are denoted by
shared/unshared and writeable/non-writeable (read). The









If the memory can be divided by uses and each part has
attributes which distinguish the uses, then the management
of memory is made reasonable.
22

Segmentation provides the ability to divide the
memory into parts (segments). A segment is a collection of
information important enough to be given a name. Each
segment is distinguished from others by its logical
attributes, that provide the basis for the desired control.
Segmentation provides a mechanism for a limited portion of a
processes' information to reside in memory at any one time.
This also facilitates easy movement of information by
segment in and out of memory. The collection of all segments
that a process may access (whether or not In physical
memory) is what composes its address space.
2. Loading
The loading of a segment consists of finding a
segment and making it known (discussed later) to the
requesting process (viz., adding the segment to the address
space). It is the added feature of segmentation that this
loading may be delayed until the segment is actually needed.
At that time a segment name can be transformed into a file
system pathname. The pathname can then be resolved into the
unique identifier for a segment. Then the supervisor
requests a segment number be assigned by the kernel, which
makes the segment known to the process. If the segment is
then required for execution it is physically loaded into
memory when actually referenced.
Each segment has associated with it a segment
descriptor [6] which contains its attributes (address in
24

memory, size, access allowed). Since this descriptor is
referenced "by the hardware at each access request to this
segment, then the memory uses can be distinguished. The
different segment descriptors of a process can then he
contained in a descriptor list. This design utilizes the MMU
(memory management unit) which consists of a set of
registers to implement the descriptor list. Each register
(segment descriptor) contains the descriptor of a particular
segment. The MMU registers retain the distinct attributes of
each segment at execution time and, therefore, makes it
possible for another process to share selected segments, if
desired
.
The dynamics of a segment fall into two classes,
physical and logical. An example of the physical dynamics is
the request of a user for write access to a currently used
segment. The operating system can physically move the
segment from local to global memory so the segment can be
shared without the user's knowledge. A stack segment whose
size varies is an example of logical dynamics.
3. Dynamic Linking'
When a procedure segment makes an external reference
to another segment, the address of the later segment must be
determined. This is called linking, the constructing of
executable instructions that achieve references to extemel
objects (segments). Linking need not be completed at load
time. It can be postponed until the actual reference is
25

encountered. This waiting to Link, until referenced, is
called dynamic linking[8] . Segmentation is not necessary to
achieve dynamic linking, hut it helps. When a process begins
execution, it should not have to find and bring into memory
any more of its segments than is absolutely necessary to
begin running. The mere presence of a reference to an
external segment in a segments text is no guarantee that the
flow of control will touch this reference. Therefore, there
is little point to undertake the expense of finding a
segment and making it known unless there is some significant
expectation that that segment will be referenced during the
time allotted to that process. Dynamic linking permits
unnecessary linking to be eliminated.
Once the segment has been made known to the process
(assigned a segment number), even though it may be moved in
and out of memory, the references to this segment need not
be changed since the segment number remains the same. The
segment descriptor is used to reflect the presence of a
segment in memory and the current address in memory. The
segment looses none of its attributes by virtue of having
been made known to this process.
4. Information Sharing
Segmentation allows direct addressability by the
process to any segment within the process' address space.
The basic advantage of direct addressability is that the
copying of data is no longer mandatory. A segment is also a
26

unit of sharing. This eliminates the need to duplicate a
segment for each requesting process and saves memory. Even
more important is the idea that sharing provides a means of
inter-process communication. This is important for realizing
the power of the explicit process structure, that is
essential to an effective multi-processor environment.
In general each procedure segment must be pure to
ensure sharing is implemented correctly. A pure procedure
operates on variables in registers or in separate data
segments associated with the process. It never stores data
internally, nor does it alter itself. The linkage segment is
such a data segment used to support the pure procedure. A
linkage segment is associated with each process. The linkage
segment is composed of linkage sections. There is one
linkage section for each procedure segment. The linkage
section is used to place all alterable information (linkage
faults, segment numbers, other static temporary variables)
for the pure procedures. Thus, the processes' segments which
are pure may be shared while linkage sections must be unique
to each process. The fact that the linkage segments are not
shared makes it possible to assign different segment numbers
to the same procedure in different processes since segment
numbers occur explicitly only in linkage segments, that may
be different for each process.
The approach in this design is to place the copies
of requested segments into local memory, thereby reducing
the data bus traffic If the read-write access requirements
27

are such that a segment must be physically shared, then it
is placed in global memory and every process that is given
access will access it there. The key to this memory
management is segmentation that keeps a segment's attributes
explicit. The kernel can properly manage placement in local
and global memory with no intervention from the supervisor




The access control in this design is separated into
discretionary (supervisor) and non-discretionary (security
kernel). When a segment is requested the supervisor
references the access control list attribute for that
segment and the access authorized for that process (subject)
is determined. The supervisor then passes this to the
security kernel so that a non-discretionary check can be
made. The kernel compares the access class of the segment
with that of the process and the appropriate access is
allowed. This access authorized is always the lesser of that
requested by the supervisor and that permitted by the
kernel. The access one process has for a segment is




Some members of the family of operating systems will
not include all of the functions made available by this
28

design. As an example, consider a family member (e.g. for
tactical system) supporting applications that are entirely
resident in memory and pre-linked. It would require none of
the virtual memory functions provided by the supervisor.
This design readily allows this sort of functional
subsetting because of its loop free structure [9]
.
C. SECURITY
The increased capability of the computer system in the
last decade has dramatically increased its possible uses.
Many users have actively allowed the computer system to
assume an increasing number of jobs upon which the user
depends to successfully function. As more dependence was
placed on the computer it became evident (regrettably by
example) that a knowledgeable user (employee of a user) who
has access to the computer also has access to all the
information contained within the system. Users such as the
government (classified information), banking facilities
(transfer of funds), corporations (trade secrets) have a
need to protect certain information from specific users;
therefore, there is an increasing demand for a secure
computer system. Designating a specific computer to only run
at a specific security class or only running certain
security classes at specific times has proven unsatisfactory
for the user who has information at many access classes.
What is commonly called a "multilevel" environment is one in
which information and users at different security classes
29

can exist simultaneously on the same computer system without
permitting a user to access information he is not authorized
to use. One goal is to design a system which will allow
secure operation in a multilevel environment.
1 . Computer Security Problems
The initial attempts to provide a secure system
involved adding security onto existing systems. This proved
largely useless for designers were intuitively trying to
block methods of would-be-penetrators rather than providing
a technically sound system design. These futile attempts [10]
led to the emerging technique of methodically designing a
secure system based on a security kernel derived from a
mathematical model (discussed later).
Information security can be provided by external
and/or internal control. External control includes guards,
watch dogs, door ciphers or anything which would prevent an
unauthorized penetration of the compound. Once the
penetration is made, the pot of gold is exposed. The
internal control is concerned with preventing unauthorized
penetration of the computer system. This involves insuring
the effectiveness of internal mechanisms in the operating
system so that only authorized exchanges of information in a
multilevel environment can occur. This includes providing no
information to unauthorized users and consistent replies to
security violations. The latter is necessary to insure no
inadvertant leakage of information [4] concerning the
30

internal mechanisms. External control is expensive and
human-prone. It does not provide for the secure sharing of
information needed by many applications, thus forcing users
to forego many of the capabilities of modern computers. A
goal of this thesis is to design an operating system that
provides information security by utilizing internal control.
External controls are, of course, still required to
physically protect the computer system's information.
The reference monitor is an abstraction created to
present the conceptual idea of providing a secure computer
system. The reference monitor is composed of subjects,
objects, and an access matrix. Subjects are system entities
such as a user or a process that, can access system
resources. Objects are system entities such as data,
programs and peripheral devices that can be accessed by
subjects. The access matrix represents the permitted
accesses between subjects and objects. The reference monitor
must support the ability of subjects to reference objects as
per the access matrix and it must also support the ability
to alter the access matrix.
The security kernel [2] is a relatively recent
technical breakthrough for computer security. The security
kernel is that portion of the computer's hardware and
software which enforces the authorized access relationships
between subjects and objects. It is the realization of the
abstract concept of a reference monitor. The software
portion of the kernel acts as an interface between the rest
31

of the system and the hardware. The software content of the
security kernel is influenced by the hardware features of
the processor. The underlying idea is that if the hardware
is proven correct and if the software is kept small and it
can he proven correct, then we can provide internal security
controls that are effective against all possible internal
attacks. Global variables such as the unique identifier have
been excluded from the supervisor. This has been done to
prevent undesired leakage of information. The global
variables are placed in the kernel where their proper use
can be verified [111
.
The security kernel must meet three essential design
requirements. First, the kernel must be tamperprocf. Second,
the kernel must be invoked on every attempt to access
information. Every reference must be checked by either
software or hardware that is provided with sufficient
information to make correct decisions on granting or denying
access. Finally, the kernel must be subject to
certification. "Subject to certification" implies that the
kernel's correctness must be proveable in a rigorous manner
using a mathematical model as the basis for the criteria to
be met.
In developing a secure system the approach to be
followed should consist of the following: determine the
security policy to be enforced, develop a mathematical model
consistent with desired security policy, design a security
kernel based on the mathematical model, implement the design
32

using available hardware and required software. A computer
system is said to be "secure" with respect to some specific
security policy. A security policy consists of the external
laws, rules and regulations that establish what access is to
be permitted. There are two distinct types of security
policy: non-discretionary and discretionary.
NON-DISCRETIONARY POLICY involves checking the
requested (viz., the object's) access class (oac) with the
access class of the (subject) requestor (sac) to insure they
are compatible. Each system contains a lattice structure [12]
that defines the relationships between different access




The lattice can be totally ordered (all classes related) or
it can be partially ordered (not all classes related). An
example of a policy with totally ordered classes would be
the government classification (unclassified, confidential,
secret, top secret) of information, oac and the access class
of its' users, sac, called the user's clearance. For such a
lattice policy the system must insure that access to
classified information is always confined to cleared users.
DISCRETIONARY POLICY involves checking an access
control list (ACL). If the user requesting access is not
included on the ACL then the access is not permitted. This
allows users to specify who can access their files. This
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policy really lies within the non-discretionary structure
and provides further refinement. This policy would reflect
the "need to know' rule of DOD.
There are many distinct system designs which
correspond to the almost endless number of policies;
however, the current state of the art allows a simple,
uniform mechanism for nearly all practical policies. The
implication is that the kernel designer does not have to
concern himself with the particular security policy of a
specific customer. He must, however, consider the two broad
classes of policy: discretionary and non-discretionary.
2. Mathematical Model
A. mathematical model [13] is a powerful design tool
for formally translating the requirements of security policy
into a precise representation of the behavior of the
corresponding security kernel. The mathematical model is a
finite state machine model that gives a set of rules of
operation for making a state transition. If the system is
initialized to a secure state, then the rules of operation
guarantee that all subsequent states are secure. Previous
research[14] has proven that security kernels whose design
is based on mathematical models can be certified correct.
Two of the basic elements of the model are subjects
and objects. The model defines types of accesses that a
subject may have to an object. These access types are read
and/or write. The state of the system with respect to
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non-discretionary and discretionary security is represented
by four sets (b, m, f, h). This design implements
non-discretionary security policy in the kernel (sets b, f)
and the discretionary policy in the supervisor (sets m, h).
The folowing discussion pertains to non-discretionary
securi ty.
b - represents the current access relationships that
exists between all subjects and objects. This set is
represented by the segment descriptor list, viz., the
contents of the hardware registers in the MMU (memory
management unit ) .
f - gives the access class of all subjects and
objects in the system. This set is distributed in this
design: the process's access class is found in the active
process table (APT) and the segments access class is in the
active segment table (AST).
The desired properties of the system are then
realized in the form of rules. These rules enforce the
desired security policy by manipulating the sets which may
or may not change the state of the system. If the state of
the system is changed it must guarantee that the new state
is secure.
The discretionary security policy is enforced in the
supervisor. This design decision was made because of the
lesser importance of "need to know' controls to the




The sets which are used to enforce the discretionary
policy are m and h.
m - corresponds to an access matrix which represents
the potential access of the subjects to objects (implements
the "need to know" security policy). This set is represented
by the access control list for the segment (object).
h - indicates how the objects are hierarchically
organized in a directory tree structure. The hierarchical
tree structure consists of nodes, leaves, and a root from
which the tree eminates. The nodes represent a directory
segment (list of attributes for other segments) and the
leaves represent non-directory segments (data or procedure).
A user is free to create either directory or non-directory
segments. The ability to add directories implies that a
user, if he chooses, can add to the overall system hierarchy
a subtree of arbitrary depth.
3 . Properties And Conditions
There are a few basic security properties which
need to be considered:
SIMPLE SECURITY CONDITION- this condition addresses
the problem of security compromise. If in set b all subjects
have an access class greater than or equal to the access
class of their objects, this condition is satisfied. This
insures the subject only reads information at or below the
class for which it is cleared.
CONFINEMENT - this property addresses potential
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(rather than actual) security compromises. If all subjects
could he trusted to perform in a proper manner (with respect
to security), then this property would not he needed. The
fact is that unless a program is proven to behave in a
certain fashion as described by the mathematical model or
formal specification, we cannot make any statements
concerning its behavior. We must therefore make the
assumption that the programs will attempt to violate
security regulations. Subjects are therefore assumed to be
untrustworthy. The potential for a security compromise
occurs when a subject has simultaneous read access which is
at class a and write access at class b (class a >class b).
For example, the potential for compromise is realized if two
events occur: (1) the subject reads secret information from
the secret object and writes it into the unclassified
object. (2) a second subject whose access class is
unclassified gains access to this (nominally unclassified)
object and reads the secret information. There are two ways
of preventing this type of situation from occurring: high
water mark and confinement property.
High Water Mark - upgrade the class of the file to
the highest class requested. This solution, while
technically correct, would over classify information so that
it would not be available to normally cleared subjects.
Confinement Property (^-Property) - this prooerty
requires that all objects to which a subject has write
access have the same access class as the subject and that
3?

all objects to which it has read access have an access class
less than or equal to the access class of the subject. Since
a subject will always have write access to some object if it
is to perform a computation, we define the current access
class to be that class at which the subject wishes to have
write access. Since all subjects are assumed untrustworthy
with respect to security requirements, the confinement
property eliminates the certification requirement outside
the security kernel. This eliminates the immense job of
certifying the supervisor and the user programs. This
property is enforced in the kernel by not allowing any
subject write access to an object with a lower access class.
COMPATIBILITY PROPERTY - If an object in the
hierarchical structure is inferior (child) to an object
(parent) and the access class of the parent is greater than
that of the child, then a subject with an access class the
same as the child can never access that information since it
can not access the access control list which is kept in the
parent. In order to avoid this problem we introduce the
concept of "compatibility". A hierarchy is compatible if
access classes are non-decreasing as one moves down the
hierarchy from the root. The access class of an object in
the hierarchy must always be greater than or equal to the
access class of its parent. Since the root has no parent its
security attributes are implied (viz., are the "lowest" of
any object). In this design compatibility is enforced in the
kernel, but not in the traditional sense of enforcing the
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access relationship of the parent/child hierarchical
structure. There is no hierarchical structure in the kernel.
When the segment is created the compatibility is implicitly-
enforced before the request is allowed.
The reference monitor is an abstraction of the
hardware and software mechanisms that mediate all attempts
by subjects to access objects. The decision to permit or
deny access is determined by the security kernel. The
mathematical model is an interpretation of the reference
monitor abstraction and describes the behavior of a secure
system in terms of four component data bases (b, m, f, h)
and rules of operation. These rules specify how the data
base may be changed, they represent an "authorize"
operation. The security kernel can only allow subjects to
access objects as permitted by its representation of the
model's set b. The data base of the security kernel must
correspond to the model's data base and can only change as
permitted by the model's rules.
The reference monitor of a physical computer system
is realized by a combination of software and hardware. The
portion required in software depends on the capabilities and
limitations of the hardware. There may be objects to which
the hardware can not properly control access and there may
be alternative representations of the same security state.
Either one of these situations require a kernel function
that does not change the security state. In the former case
there would be one or more functions to permit interpretive
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access to an object; in the latter there would be functions
for changing the representations of the security state
without changing the actual state.
Thus the functions of the security kernel
software [2] fall into three classes that correspond to the
fundamental operations of authorize, access, and null: (1)
functions that correspond to the rules of the model, thus
changing the security state; (2) functions that implement a
part of the reference monitor by allowing interpretive
access to objects as permitted by the current security
state, thus complementing the hardware access controls ar.d
(3) functions that change the representation of the current
security state .
4. Segmentation
The mathematical model addresses abstract subjects
and objects. In this design subjects are the processes and
the principal information objects are segments. Processes
(subjects) can only access segments (objects) as permitted
by the access controls. Every segment has associated with it
logical attributes (access class, size, read/write
permission) which are made visible at the time of actual
reference to the information. Sy including access control as
part of the logical attributes, a way to control access to
the information in the system has been provided. Only
"authorized" accesses are allowed.
Segmentation provides the mechanism so that all
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online information stored in the system is directly
addressable by a processor and hence available for direct
reference by any computation. A basic advantage of direct
addressability is that users can physically share a single
copy. A concern which arises from sharing is that
information may be passed illegally between users. This is
prevented by the enforcement of the confinement property and
the simple security condition. The copying of data is no
longer mandatory as many users can share a single copy with
controlled access .
5 . Hardware Requirements
There are no absolute hardware requirements for
secure computer systems, any hardware is theoretically
acceptible. Given the current state of the technology,
however, certain hardware features are essential if we are
to build efficient secure systems [2]. These essential
features reduce and simplify the software portion of the
security kernel . Reduction and simplification of software at
the expense of additional hardware is necessary because
producing proveably correct software and hardware in the
security kernel is a necessity to achieve computer security.
One of the essential features is support for a
segmented memory. Segmentation allows all information in the
system to be stored in one type of object, the segment.
Havinar to support only a single object type simplifies the
kernel. Segmentation allows all information in the system to
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be ccmpartneritallized into individual packages called
segments. Every segment has associated with it access
controls as previously mentioned. Only authorized accesses
as delineated in the access control list and allowed by the
access class are permitted. The address of information is
composed of two parts (segment #, offset). It is necessary
to efficiently resolve the two dimensional address into an
absolute address, therefore segmentation should be
implemented in hardware.
The other essential hardware feature is multiple
execution domains. This feature is used in most contemporary
systems to protect operating systems from applications
programs. Strictly speaking only two execution domains are
necessary (one for the kernel and one for everything else),
but in practice it will still be desireable to continue to
protect the operating system from applications software so






When designing an operating system there are several
approaches to consider: top down, bottom up and middle out.
Although most designs begin as top down or bottom up they
generally end up as middle out. In the design there are
several design choices available to the designer. In some
cases a certain design choice will preclude the ability to
utilize a specific design later on in the system design,
while in other cases a specific design choice could be a
driving force to dictate other design choices. Eor example
in the SYSTEM the design choice was made to keep the kernel
relatively small to reduce the verification process. This
particular choice became a heavily weighted factor when, for
example, deciding where to support the demand memory
management which ended up in the supervisor. Following are
some of the design techniques that contributed to the
SYSTEM.
1. Resource Visualization
By using virtual processors and virtual memory
throughout the upper levels of the design, most of the
design is independent of the physical configuration. The
SYSTEM provides the virtual to real binding in the kernel.
This permits changing the configuration to meet user or
43

maintenance requirements without major changes to the
system. Since the processes are assigned virtual processors
there is no effect on the user when real processors are
added or deleted (except for the change in performance). Of
particular interest was the ability to add and delete
processors to the SYSTEM. More important was to develop a
design that allowed good capacity growth with the addition
of processors. In general, configuration independence
implies that the hardware (processors, memory and
peripherals) can he reconfigured without causing any
problems visible to the user.
2. Distributed System
The SYSTEM is distributed logically and physically.
Logically, portions of the operating system are distributed
within the address space of the users process within the
supervisor and kernel domains. The use of domains permits
the process to maintain its security attributes while
interacting with the operating system.
The physical distribution of segments among the
individual local memories provides performance (provides
high speed memory access and limits 3US contention). The
physical distribution allows the tradeoff of memory (viz.,
multiple copies) for performance. Although one of the
potential benefits of segmentation is sharing of pure
procedures the choice was made to disregard this benefit
when possible (no user has write access). This allows the
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segment (viz., a copy) to reside in local memory to reduce
BUS contention. The initial hypothesis is that the memory
wasted (much of it possibly ROM) is a small price to pay to
allow performance to grow well with the addition of
processors. This addresses the problem that in typical
multiprocessor systems capacity scales poorly because of
increase load on the BUS. However, this choice is not
fundamental to the design and could be changed to eliminate
multiple copies.
Similarly for processors, processing is distributed
to processors to eliminate the dependency on a single
controlling unit. The system wide data bases are kept in
global memory providing access to all processors.
3. Multiple Protection Domains
The foremost consideration in the design of the
SYSTEM was security. This is acheived by use of the security
kernel technology, and segmentation provides one of the keys
to providing" security within the system. The set of segments
that are accessible is defined as a domain. The conventional
two state system does not provide the desired support for a
secure system. For this reason the 2-state (and associated 2
domains) is generalized to a hierarchical n-domain
system[6] . In the design of the SYSTEM (a minimum of)
3-domains were considered adequate - user, supervisor and
kernel. In addition, the design permits that, based on user
application, a number of user domains could be supported.
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Each domain is in concept similar to a ring[6]. The
authorized access of a process is determined by the current
ring of execution. The access within the different rings
form a set of nested domains. Ring (kernel) is the largest
set and ring n-1 is the smallest.
The ring structure with the associated controls
provides a means for regulating the information that passes
between domains (rings). Cross-ring calls and parameter
passing are well defined [15] . When the proper controls are
used they allow outer rings to make requests to inner rings,
but also protect the inner rings from unintentional or
intentional tampering. The ring structure when combined with
segmentation provides mechanism for the design of an
effective secure system by protecting the secure kernel.
4. Multiprocessing
The process structure provides the essentials for
parallel processing: support for a set of assynchronous
processes that can communicate with each other. Parallel
processing does not require a multi-processor environment.
However, in a multi-processor environment parallel
processing can provide faster completion of a job.
There are many applications for parallel processing
within tactical as well as non-tactical systems. Whenever a
job depends on a mixture of asynchronous and synchronous
tasks and time is a factor, parallel processing is a
possible solution to getting the job done in the allocated
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time. By using several processors working on the same job,
each doing seperate tasks, the overall time required to do
the job can "be reduced (provided the job has been structured
into explicit processes). In microprocessors where
processors are relatively inexpensive and slow, parallel
processing may be the answer to keeping the cost down while
still being able to complete the job in the required time.
The above discussion provides some of the major reasons why
the SYSTEM was designed to support parallel processing on
multiple processors.
5. 'Cache ' Memory Strategy
A cache memory is generally thought of as a small
amount of high speed memory that is utilized with a large
low speed main memory in a system to construct a memory
system that appears to be a larger high speed memory. This
appearance of a high speed memory is generally possible as a
result of locality of reference [16, p. 3011 .
In a multiprocessor environment, where each
processor has its own cache memory, problems arise when
accessing shared memory. The main problem being that shared,
writable memory cannot be put in a cache. Segmentation
allows the assignment of attributes to segments, which
provides a way to identify cacheable segments (those
segments that are not writable and shared).
In a multi-microprocessor system where BUS
contention can become a problem a cache memory strategy
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could "be quite effective in reducing the number of requests
to the main memory, even though the cache and shared memory
are the same speed. The main advantage is avoiding access to
the system BUS rather than the increase in speed of the
actual memory access. The SYSTEM uses the strategy of a
cache in the form of a local memory per processor. Now
rather than being a copy of what is in global memory the
local memory (cache) becomes the place where the data is
stored instead of global memory (note that with a cache,
global memory need not contain a copy while the information
is in the cache)
.
Each processor has its own local memory which is
relatively large in size where cacheable segments are
stored. This means that large blocks of data will be moved
when a process is removed from one processor and
(subsequently) loaded on another processor. In addition a
global memory is utilized for shared writable segments
(unencacheable segments). Segmentation allows the SYSTEM to
utilize the concept of caches and main memory but in the
form of local and global memory. The overall reason is the
same (speed up memory access), but in the SYSTEM this is
achieved by reducing the BUS contention through directing
most access to local memory.
6. Multiprogramming
In a system where there are more processes than
processors there must be a means of switching processors
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from process to process. Some reasons for switching process
are: current process completes, a higher priority process is
ready, current process is blocked, or current process is
waiting I/O. Whatever the reason for switching, there are
certain things that must he done in performing the switch:
first, save the address space of the old process as well as
the current execution point represented by a portion of the
processor state, and secondly, reloading the address space
and previous execution point cf the new process. The process
switch must occur in a specific sequence to insure the new
process resumes execution at the same point and in the same
logical state as when it was previously switched. In the
SYSTEM re-establishing the local memory to its previous
state becomes part of the process switch (when switching
user processes )
.
Eecause of the overhead (unloading and loading all
the MMU registers) associated with process switches,
provisions are included to make the processes semi-dedicated
to a processor and thus make the requirement for memory
switches infrequent. In order to make the process switch
totally hidden outside the kernel, the segments that were in
memory the last time the process was executing must be
loaded in memory prior to allowing the process to resume
execution. The lack of a "DBR" [5 ,p. 12] is a problem, but
saving copies of the MMU, that can. be reloaded when required
reduces the severity of the problem.
7. Family of Operating Systems
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The design in this thesis is not really for a single
operating system, "but rather for a whole family of operating
systems. For any specific system the family member chosen
depends on the functions required. A tactical system which
is static in nature does not require many of the user
services supported by the SYSTEM. For this reason the family
member that consists of only the kernel could he the
specific operating system chosen for a tactical system. A
general purpose time sharing system, on the other hand, is
very dynamic in nature, utilizing large address spaces,
variable number of users, etc. The family member that
supports dynamic linking, a hierarchical file system and
demand memory management could be the specific operating
system for the general purpose time sharing system.
Operating system sub-setting refers to the ability
to form meaningful sub-sets of an operating system. In the
design of the SYSTEM a sub-setting capability was one of the
goals. The structure is such that many of the services
provided oy the SYSTEM can be eliminated without effecting
the usefulness of the remaining system. That is the SYSTEM
can be tailored to fit a number of specific requirements.
This is made possible primarily by utilizing a loop free
structured! within the design. For explanation purposes
consider the operating system to be composed of modules. In
a loop fTee structure the dependency is inward or downward
(toward the hardware), depending on your point of view. A
module only depends on another module at a lower level.
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Requiring a loop free dependency structure allows system
correctness to be established one nodule at a time.
Modifying a module would only effect the modules above which
depend on it.
The design choice to keep the kernel relatively small
and put the common user services in the supervisor lends
itself to sub-setting. The security kernel would not be
changed in any of the sub-sets ani thus would not require
re-verification. The supervisor supported services (dynamic
linking, discretionary security, demand memory management,
hierarchical file system) could be removed to meet the needs
of the specific use of the system. This makes the sub-sets
of the SYST3M suitable for tactical application, where there
is generally no need for demand memory management or dynamic
linking (static environment), as well as for general purpose
application where all the features can be utilized. It
should be noted that any of these meaningful sub-sets would
be a secure system since the kernel remains unchanged in
every sub-set. Sub-sets of the kernel can also be
constructed; however, this would require reverification of
the kernel
.
S. Levels Of Abstraction
Abstraction is a way of avoiding complexity and a
tool by which a finite piece of reasoning can cover a myriad
of cases [17], The purpose of abstracting is net to be vague,
but to create a semantic level in which one can be
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absolutely precise. Levels of abstraction have been
demonstrated to be a powerful design methodology for complex
systems. In general, the use of levels of abstraction leads
to a better design with greater clarity and fewer errors. A
level is defined not only by the abstraction that it
supports (for example, a segmented virtual memory) but also
by the resources employed to realize that abstraction. Lower
levels (closer to the machine) are not aware of the
abstractions or resources of higher levels? higher levels
may apply the resources of lower levels only by appealing to
the functions of the lower levels. This pair of restrictions
reduces the number of interactions among parts of a system
and makes them more explicit.
Each level of abstraction creates a virtual machine
environment. Programs above some level do not need to know
how the virtual machine of that level is implemented. For
example, if a level of abstraction creates sequential
processes and multiplexes one or more hardware processors
among them, then at higher levels the number of physical
processors in the system is not important. 3y the rules of
abstraction calls to a procedure at a different level must
always be made in a downward direction and the corresponding
return in the upward direction. Note that at least two of
the levels (kernel and supervisor) define virtual machines
with rigidly enforced (via hardware) invocation of 'extended




The SYSTEM is composed of two parts, the supervisor and
the kernel. The supervisor provides operating system
services while the kernel manages physical resources. This
division also contributes to the ability to sub-set without
affecting the kernel. The supervisor, which consists of
procedures, is distributed and exists within the supervisor
domain of each user process. The kernel is made up of both
procedures and system processes. The procedures are part of
the distributed operating system and exist within the kernel
domain of each user process. The system processes are not
distributed but are separate processes.
1. Notation
The following is an explanation of the notation used
in the following discussions. When a CALL is used the name
of the module is given followed by the parameters within
parenthesis. When a name in quotes appears as the first
parameter in the parantheses it is used to specify the entry
within the module. For example CALL INNER_TC ( 'UNLOAD
'
,
SEGMENT,*, WRITTEN) the module name is INNSR_TC, 'UNLOAD'
specifies the entry point and SEGMENT_* and WRITTEN are the
parameters. When a SIGNAL is used the first name in quotes
specifies the process for whom the signal is intended, the
second name in quotes (optional) specifies the specific
function requested of that process and the remaining names
represent parameters. For example SIGNAL ( 'MEMORY_MANAGER'
53

'OUT', SEG-KENT_#, WRITTEN) the signal is meant for the
memory manager process, 'OUT' is the requested function and
SEGMENT_* and WRITTEN are parameters. WAIT is used when a
process cannot continue execution until it receives a signal
from another process. WAIT( P?.OCESS_ID, MSG) . The return
parameters PROCESS_II) and MSG- are used to indicate the
process that sent the signal and the message sent. It should
be noted that the above notation is only used to simplify
the understanding of what is happening. In an actual
implementation the parameters need not be passed in
precisely this fashion.
2 . System Overview
The following is an overview of the SYSTEM'S modules
and processes and how they function. Figure 2 represents the
modules that exist in the distributed supervisor and the
distributed kernel. The levels are used to indicate the
dependencies that exist between these modules. The
supervisor is made up of four levels of abstraction. It
should be noted that all data within the supervisor is per
process .
The linker, a level 1 module called LINKER, exists
in a segmented virtual memory and provides the mechanisms of
dynamic linking. He is invoked by CALL
LINOR(SYM30LIC_NAME). It should be noted that the call
could be by link fault as in MULTICS[6]. The linker keeps











The linker utilizes the CALL SEARCH(SYMBOLIC_NAME,
SEGPENT_#) to obtain the segment number for unsnapped links.
The searcher, a level 2 module called SEARCH, is
invoked by SEAECH(SYKBOLIC_NAME, SEGr<ENT_#) and is required
to return the segment number of the segment specified by the
symbolic name. By applying the 'search rules' the symbolic
name is converted to a path name in the hierarchical file
system. The searcher gets the desired segment number by the
CALL SEG_HNB(?ATH_NAME t SEGMENT_#).
The segment handler, a level 3 module called
SEG_HNL\ is invoked by CALL SEG_HND( ?ATH_NAME , SEGMENTJ*)
and is responsible for returning the appropriate segment
number. The segment handler utilizes the Segment Table
(figure 4) as its data base. To maintain the data base he
uses the CALL SEG_MGR( 'MAKE_KNOWN
'
, PAR__SEG_#, ENTRT_#,
ACCESS, SEGMENT_#, SIZE) to the kernel to obtain a segment
number for a segment and the CALL DISC_SEC ( SEGMENT_#
,
ENTRY_#, ACCESS) to determine the authorized access
(discretionary). The segment handier is also invoked by the
virtual faults, SEG_HND( 'SEG_EAULT' , SEGMENT.*) and
SEG_END( >EM_FAULT', SEGMENT_#). The 'SEG_FAULT' is a
discretionary security access check and is handled by a CALL
DISC_SEC(SEGMENT_*, ENTRT_#) . The 'MEM_FAULT' is a request
to bring a segment into memory and is handled by a CALL
MEM_END(S3GMENT_#, SIZE).
The memory handler and discretionary security, level






































invoked by MEM_HND(SEGMENT_#, SIZE) and DISC_SEC ( SEGMENT_#
,
ENTST_#, ACCESS) respectively. The memory handler provides
the dynamic memory management utilizing the Memory Map data
"base (figure 5). The memory handler uses the CALL
SEG_MGR( 'SWA?_IN', SEGMSNT_#, BASE_ADDRESS ) in the kernel to
brin* a segment into memory and the CALL SEG_MGR( 'SWAP_0UT
'
SEGMENT_#) to remove a segment. The discretionary security
checks the access control lists to determine the authorized
access of the process (discretionary).
The distributed kernel is composed of three levels.
The segment manager, a kernel level 1 module called SEG_MGR,
is invoked by the CALL SEG_MGR( 'MAKE_KNOWN ' , PAR_SEG_#,
ENTRY_#, ACCESS, SEGMENT_#), CALL SEG_MGR ( 'SWAP_IN '
,
SEGMENT_#, BASE_ADDRESS) and CALL SSG_MGR( 'SWAP_OUT
'
SEGMENT_#). The segment manager maintains the Known Segment
Table (figure 6) as a per process data base. The segment
manager determines allowable access by the CALL
NON_DISC_SEC(UNIQUE_ID, ACCESS) and assigns segment numbers
by the CALL INNSR_TC( 'ASSIGN', S2GM3NT_#, ACCESS). The
segment manager brings segments into memory by
SIG-NAL('MEMORT_MANAGER', 'IN', SEGMENT_#, UNIQUS_ID,
5ASE_ADDRESS ) and removes segments from memory by
SIGNAL( 'MEMORY_MAMAGER', 'OUT', SEGMENT_#).
The non-discretionary security, a Kernel level 2
module called NON_DISC_SEC , is responsible for determining
the authorized access for a given segment. Non-discretionary
security is invoked by the CALL NON_DISC_SEC(UNIQUS_ID,
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FIGURE 6
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The traffic controller, a kernel level 2 module
called TRAFEIC_CONT, is responsible for multiplexing user
processes to virtual processors. The traffic controller
utilizes the Active Process Table (figure 7) as its data
base. traffic controller is invoked by the CALL
TRAFEIC_CONT( 'BLOCK', MSG, WAKING_ID) and CALL
TRAEEIC_CONT( 'WAKEUP', P?.0CESS_ID, MSG). The traffic
controller uses the SIGNAL( 'MEMORTJ1ANAGER' , 'LOAD',
7IRT_MEM_MAP) and SIGNAL ( 'MEMORY_MANAC-ER ' , 'UNLOAD',
WRIT_3IT_MAP ) to load and unload the processes' segments in
memory on the virtual processors. The traffic controller
uses the CALL INNER_TC( 'LOAD_MMU
'
, ?RCCESS_ID) AND CALL
INNER_TC('UNLOAD_MMU') to load or unload the memory
management registers of the virtual processors. The traffic
controller uses the CALL I NNER_TC ( 'IDLE' ) to remove a
virtual processor from contention for rescources. Actually
the virtual processor is assigned the lowest priority
available and the idle process is loaded.
The inner traffic controller, a kernel level 3
module called INNSR_TC, provides the multiplexing of virtual
processors to real processors. The inner traffic controller
uses the Processor Table (figure 3) as its data base.
The non-distributed kernel consists of two system
processes. The memory manager process maintains the Active
Segment Table (figure 9) and Global Memory Map (figure 10)
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memory manager process is responsible for putting segments
in local/global memory based on user's access.
The I/O manager process processes all the external
I/O, this includes I/O to and from the user terminals. The
terminals can be thought of as being hard wired. Specific
terminals have specific access classes** therefore no kernel
passwords are required to determine access class.
The next three sections provide a detailed
discussion of the design.
3 . Supervisor








SU?_CR2ATE_PR0CESS ( PROCESSED , ADDR3SS_S?ACE )
SUP_DESTROY_PROCESS (PROCESSED)
a. Linker (Supervisor)
The linker exists in a segmented virtual memory
environment. It is only aware of symbolic names and segment
numbers. The choice was made to provide dynamic linking and
not assign segment numbers to segments at compile or load
time; therefore there is a requirement to resolve external
references at run time. In general it is the linker's job to
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intervene on a procedure's external references and direct
the reference to the appropriate segment. To accomplish this
the linker utilizes a "linkage segment" (each process has a
linkage segment). The linkage segment contains an entry for
each segment known to the process.
Each external reference results in a call to the
linker with a parameter that on first reference permits
finding the symbolic name of the desired segment.
LINKER(SYMBOLIC_NAME) The linker searches for
the entry corresponding to the symbolic name. If found it
transfers to the segment number and offset specified in the
linkage segment. If not found (first reference) it must
first determine the segment number and offset. To obtain the
segment number the linker calls the searcher passing as a
parameter the symbolic name. SEARCH(SYMBOLIC_NAME,
3EGMENT_#) The parameter returned is the segment number. The
linker completes the entry in the linkage segment and
transfers control to the desired segment,
b. Searcher (Supervisor)
The searcher is aware of the hierarchical file
system and a set of search rules. It is involked by
SEARCH(SYMBOLIC_MAME, SEGMENT_*). The searcher has the task
of resolving a symbolic name into a path name. The searcher
recieves as a parameter a symbolic name which is processed
and eventually the segment number of the symbolically named
segment is returned. To accomplish this the searcher applies
the 'search rules '[6]. The search rules are a list of path
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names and a simple technique that convert the symbolic name
to a path name (note that this is independent of security).
The searcher utilizes a calling directory and working
directory [6, p. 230]. Once the path name is determined the
searcher calls the segment handler passing the path name as
a parameter. SSG_HND(PATH_NAME , SEGMENT_#) The parameter
returned is the segment number. The searcher returns passing
the segment number as a parameter to the linker.
c. Segment Handler (Supervisor)
The segment handler understands the hierarchical
file system, parent, entry number, access control lists, and
segment numbers. The segment handler deals with virtual
segment faults (access checks) and virtual memory faults. He
is involked by the call SEG_HND(PATH_NAME, SSGMENT_#). The
segment handler gets assistance in performing his tasks by
utilizing the following calls: MEW_HND(SEGMENT_#, SIZE) to
request a segment be put in virtual memory,
DISC_SEC(SEGMENT_#, ENTRY_#) a function to determine the
authorized access (discretionary security) to a segment,
SSG_MGR( 'MAKE_KNOWN', ?AR_SEG_#, ENTRY_#, ACCESS, SEGMENT_#)
a kernel call used to determine the segment number and size
of the segment indicated by the parent segment number and
entry number.
The segment handler maintains a segment table
with information that is necessary to control segments at
the supervisor level (figure -i). The segment number is
unique within the process. Parent segment number is the
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segment number of the parent and entry number is the entry
within the parent for the segment. Access is that access
authorized by the discretionary security policy. Size is the
memory required by the segment. The segment handler is
required to convert path names to segment numbers as well as
to handle virtual segment faults (discretionary security
checks) and virtual memory faults. To accomplish these tasks
the segment handler has three entry points: SEG_HND,
ME(*_FAULT and SEG_7AULT.
SEG_HND(?ATH_MAME t SEGMENT_#) The segment
handler receives as a parameter the path name of the desired
segment. One of the design characteristics of the
hierarchical file system is that access to a segment
requires read access to every segment on the path of the
segment. One by one the segments on the path name must be
made known and the access established. To do this a
recursive algorithm can be utilized that will process each
entry within the path name until the path name is resolved.
The segment number assigned to the desired segment is
returned
.
SEG_HND('MEM_?AULT' f SEGMENT_#) A virtual memory
fault is utilized to support the dynamic memory management
outside the kernel. When a segment that is not in memory is
referenced a virtual memory fault (hardware initiated, the
kernel provides the software interpretation of the fault and
provides a transfer vector to the supervisor) is generated
to the segment handler. The segment handler uses the Segment
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Table to determine the SEGMENT_# and the SIZE of the




SEG_HND( 'SEG_FAULT', SEGMENT_#) A virtual
segment fault is used to tell the supervisor that the ACL
for the segment referenced has heen changed since the last
time the segment had heen referenced. The segment handler
must re-establish the discretionary security. This is done
by checking the Segment Table for the parent's segment
number and entry number, calling DISC_SEC ( SEGMENT_#
ENTRY_#, ACCESS), check the new access, update the Segment
Table and return.
d. Memory Handler (Supervisor)
It is the job of the memory handler to provide
the dynamic memory management within a fixed size linear
virtual memory. The memory handler utilizes two kernel calls
'SWAP_IN' and 'SWAP_OUT' to perform his tasks.
SEG_MGR( 'SWAP_IN', SEGMENT_#, BASE_ADDRESS ) is used to
request that a segment be brought into memory.
SEG_MGR( 'SWAP_0UT', SEGMENT_#) is used to remove a segment
from memory.
The memory handler is tasked by the segment
handler to put a segment into memory and provided with the
SEGMENT_# and SIZE of this segment. The data base utilized
is a Memory Map (figure 5) which indicates free areas and
allocated areas. Each process has a memory nap which is used




To provide the demand memory management there
are many suitable algorithms [16, p .155] . First fit, best fit
and worst fit are among the possible choices for allocating
free areas. A least recently used algorithm is generally
used for deallocating memory. The used bit is available to
provide information to the dealocation scheme. The CALL
INNSR_TC( 'G-ET_USED_BITS ', USE2_BITS) returns an array of the
status of all the used bits. The CALL
INNER_TC( 'SET_USED_BITS ', USED_BITS) provides an array of
the desired value of the used bits. This provides the
mechanism for an approximating efficient Least Recently Used
algorithm for dealocation [16] . Allocated areas (figure 5)
are identified by (SEGMENT_#, BASE_ADDRESS , SIZE). When
tasked, the memory handler searches for a free area large
enough for the segment. If there is no free area large
enough, the memory handler must utilize the CALL
SEG_MGR( '5VA?_0UT', SEGMENT_#) to establish a large enough
free area. The memory map is updated and the CALL
SEG_MGE( 'SWAP_IM', SEGMENT_#, BASE_ADDRSSS ) is generated.
The memory map is updated and the memory handler returns.
e. Discretionary Security (Supervisor)
This module is only aware of access control
lists (figure 11) and how to search one to determine the
access to be given the current process. The input parameter
is the segment number (of the directory) and entry number of
the ACL for the desired segment. The discretionary security
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searches the ACL for the P?.OCESS_ID of the calling process
and thereby determines the access, which is returned.
4. Distributed Kernel
There is a gate mechanism (domain change) through
which all kernel and supervisor calls pass. Checks are made
to determine proper (complete) parameters and the call is
directed to the proper module. The kernel is the
"priviledged mode" and can execute priviledged instructions.
Calls coming from outside the kernel are:
















INNER_TC( 'GET_USED_BITS' , USED_BITS)
INNER_TC( 'SET_USED_BITS' , USED_BITS )
a. Segment Manager (Kernel)
The segment manager's environment is a segmented
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physical memory. The segment manager assigns segment numbers
and is responsible for maintaining the status of all
segments known to a process. The segment manager's primary
data base is the Known Segment Table (KST) (figure 6). The
unique_ID is a unique, system wide identifier assigned to
each segment. They are assigned from an available list of
integers (can be reused when a segment is deleted). Each
segment also has an alias that is the uniaue_ID of and the
entry number in its parent. This provides a means of
determining the unique_ID of a segment from the segment
number of and entry number in the parent.
It should be noted that the reason for the alias is
to prevent the unique_IL from leaving the kernel. The alias
chosen is derivable from information known to the
supervisor, because it relates to the hierarchical file
system. This information is per process and not system wide
in nature. Although the hierarchical structure of the file
system can be derived from the kernel's alias data base, the
contention is that the file system in the kernel is a flat
one. This method also eliminates the confinement problem.
The kernel only requires that the access class of a segment,
when created must be at or above the access class of the
process creating the segment.
The segment manager can be involked by several
calls:





SEG_MGR( 'SWAP_IN' t SEGMENT_#, BASE_ADDRESS
)
SEG_MGR( 'SWAP_OUT', SEGMENT_#)
The CALL SEG_MGR( 'MAKE_KNOWN
'
f PAR_SEG_#,
ENTRY_#, ACCESS, SEGMENT_#) . The task is to assign a segment
number to the segment specified. ?AR_SEG-_# and ENTRY_# are
the segment number of the parent directory and the entry
within that directory. The parent segment number is used to
determine the unique_ID of the parent from the KST and this
combined with the entry number forms an alias for the
desired segment. The segment manager searches the KST to
determine if the segment has already been assigned a segment
number (already known). If this is the case the segment
number already assigned is returned. If the segment is not
known then a KST entry must be made. The procedure is as
follows: use the ?AR_SEG_# and the KST to determine the
unique_ID of the parent. Combine the unique_ID of the parent
and the entry number to derive the alias of the segment. Use
the alias to determine the unique_ID of the desired segment
from the alias table (figure 12). CALL
NON_DISC_SEC(UNIQUE_ID, ACCESS) to determine the authorized
access. The access granted is the desired access or the
authorized access, whichever is less. Assign a segment
number. Fill in KST entry. CALL INNER_TC ( 'ADD_SEG '
,
SEGMENT_#, ACCESS). Return assigned segment number.
The CALL S3G_MGR( 'SET_SEG_?AULT ' , SEGMENT_#).






































is changed. The segment manager determines the unique_ID of
the segment specified and does a SIGNAL ( 'MEMORT_MANAGER',
'SET_SEG_IAULT', UNIQUE_ID).
The CALL SEG_MGR( 'SWAP_IN ' , SEGMENT_*,
BASE_ADDRESS ) . A request to load the specified segment into
memory at the indicated base address (relative). The segment
manager locates the appropriate KST entry and does a
SIGNAL('MENORY_MANAGER' t 'IN', SEGMENT_*, UNICUE_ID,
BASS_ADDR3SS) and a WAIT ( PROCESSED , ABS_ADD, BOUND). The
memory manager process loads the segment in memory and
returns the absolute address and hound of the segment. The
segment manager notifies the inner traffic controller of the
update in segment information CALL INNER_TC ( 'LOAD
'
,
SEGMENT_#, ABS_ADD, 30UND). The segment manager returns.
The CALL SEG_MGR( 'SWA?_0UT
'
, SEGMENT_#). The
segment manager is tasked with removing the segment from
memory. He does a CALL INNER_TC ( 'UNLOAD ', SEGMENT_#,
WRITTEN) to obtain the value of the written bit and then to
unload the segment from memory a SIGNAL ( 'MEM0RYJ1ANAGER' f
'OUT', SEGMENT_#, WRITTEN), WAIT( 'MEMORY_MANAGER') and then
returns.
b. Non-Discretionary Security (Kernel)
The purpose of the non-discretionary security is
to enforce the non-discretionary security policy by checking
the access class of the process against the access class of
the desired segment. The access is determined as a result of
this comparison. The non-discretionary security module is
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invoked by the CALL NON_DISC_SEC( UNIQUS_ID ) . An algorithm is
used for interpreting the lattice for comparing the access
classes and determining the authorized access. The
non-discretionary security module returns passing the
access .
C. Traffic Controller (Kernel)
The job of the traffic controller is to schedule
and control processes. The traffic controller utilizes an
Active Process Table (system vide) (figure 7) and a Virtual
Processor Table (figure 8) to maintain the necessary
information about each process. Each virtual processor has a
priority (this priority is used by the inner traffic
controller when the virtual processors are multiplexed on
the physical processors). PROCSSS_ID is a unique identifier
for each process, which can be mapped to the user. STATE
refers to the present state of a process (ready, block,
stop, run). AFFINITY is used to specify a binding of a
process to a virtual processor either by virtue of
dissimilar processor characteristics (strong) or the process
has segments in local memory of a processor (weak). PRIORITY
is used to determine a scheduling behavior. LOC_EX_STATS
provides the means for keeping track of the execution state
of the process and is a pointer to a storage area that
contains information about the execution state (figure 13).
The traffic controller schedules the processes
to run on virtual processors. There is a virtual processor
for every loaded process. Each virtual processor has a low
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priority process (IDLE) so that the processor is never
stopped. The traffic controller provides the BLOCK and
WAKEUP functions as a means of providing inter-process
communication. -
The traffic controller would have a priority
driven scheduling algorithm to determine what process to
schedule. This could he a simple first come first served
algorithm or it could he a complex time sharing algorithm to
dynamically change process priority. The method utilized in
this thesis is that the traffic controller works on the
premise of scheduling the ready process with the highest
priority and the proper affinity whenever a virtual
processor is availahle.
Whenever a process blocks itself it is in fact a
call to the traffic controller. The traffic controller
changes the state of the process to blocked, The traffic
controller now has the option of reassigning the virtual
processor to another user process or scheduling the idle
process (CALL INNEE_TC( 'IDLE' ) ) . In the latter case there is
no loading or unloading of the process involved and this can
be beneficial to control thrashing. Since there are other
virtual processors competing for the processor the traffic
controller scheduling algorithm will try to leave the
process loaded. When the process is put back in the run
state it will be in contention for the processor. If another
process is to be assigned to the virtual processor then the
old process must be unloaded. First the status of the
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written bits are determined (CALL INNER_TC ( 'WRITTEN_BITS ' ) )
.
The execution state of the old process is unloaded (CALL
INNER_TC( 'UNLOAD_MMU', PROCESSED, LOC_EX_STATE ) )
SIG-NAL( 'MEMORY_MANAGER', 'UNLOAD', WRIT_BIT_MA? ) and
WAIT( 'MEMORY_MANAGER', VIRT_MEM_MAP ) are generated, the
virtual memory map of the process is returned by the manager
process process. The execution state and the virtual memory
map of the old process are saved. Now the new process can be
loaded. The virtual memory map of the new process is passed
to the memory manager process, a SIGNAL( 'MEMORY_MANAGER '
,
'LOAD', VIRT_MEM_MAP) and WAIT ( 'MEMORY_MANAGER '
,
ABS_ADD_MAP) are generated. A map indicating the absolute
address of the loaded segments is returned by the memory
manager process. The execution state of the new process is
loaded (CALL INNSR_TC ( 'LOAD' , LOC_EX_STATE , A3S_ADD_MAP ) )
This completes the process of switching user processes on a
virtual processor.
The TRAFTIC_CONT( 'WA5EUP", ?FOCSSS_ID) is also
a call to the traffic controller. If the process specified
by PROCESS_ID is in the blocked state the traffic controller
puts that process in the ready state, he checks the
priorities of the running processes and if there is a lower
priority process in the run state the virtual processor it
is running on is sent a pre-empt interupt CALL
INNER_TC( '?RE_EMPT_INT', VIRT_?R0_ID ) and the traffic
controller returns. The pre-empt interupt forces the
pre-empted virtual processor to transfer control to the
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traffic controller. The traffic controller puts this process
in the ready state and then schedules the highest priority
process, subject to affinity, as indicated above. If the
idle process was running on the virtual processor and if the
process loaded in that virtual processor is in the ready
state it could be assigned the virtual processor by the CALL
I\'NER_TC('UNIDLE', VIR_PR0_ID ) . This has the effect of
unloading the idle process and loading the process that was
previously loaded. It should be noted that except for the
special case of the idle process, switching processes is
lengthy and, if done too frequently, could lead to thrashing
problems
.
The traffic controller can be invoiced by the
calls: 'STOP_PROCSSS', 'CREATE,PROCESS ' , 'START_PROCESS*
,
and 'DESTROY_?ROCESS '.
'CREATE_PROCESS ', ?ARAMETER_LIST is used to
begin a new process. An entry for the process is made in the
active process table.
'ST0P_PR0CES3 ' is used to put a process in the
STOPPED STATE and the process is removed from the active
process table and put in the stopped process table (SPT).
The SPT is similar to the APT but it is referenced
infrequently.
'START_PROCES3 ' is used to move a process from
the stopped process table (ST?) to the active process table
and also from the stopped state to the ready state.
'DESTROY PROCESS' is used to terminate the life
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of a process. The process is removed from the APT or SPT and
the memory manager process is signaled to disconnect the
process from any connected segments.
d. Inner Traffic Controller (Kernel)
The inner traffic controller multiplexes the
virtual processors with the physical processors [18] . There
is a many to one correspondence from the virtual processors
of the traffic controller to the physical processors. In
addition there are the virtual processors assigned the
system processes. The inner traffic controller uses the data
case shown in figure 14. He is also responsible for the
mapping registers (hardware segment descriptors) which
contain the information shown in figure 15. Each physical
processor has only specific virtual processors that can be
multiplexed on it. Each virtual processor has a priority and
a state (running, ready and wait). The inner traffic
controller allows the virtual processor with the highest
priority in the ready state to run on the processor. The
wait pending bit[3,p.30J is used to avoid a race condition
between the signal and wait primitives. The inner traffic
controller is able to swap the virtual processors in and out
of the processors by loading and unloading the appropriate
execution state and mapping registers.
The inner traffic controller provides
inner-process as well as intra-process services. He is
invoked by a number of calls requesting information
























to update the mapping registers. To supplement the hardware
fault within the memory management registers the inner
traffic controller maintains a set of software faults for
each segment (segment fault, memory fault). This allows the
inner traffic controller to interpret the hardware fault and
venerate an appropriate virtual fault.
INNER_TC('ASSIGN', SSGMENT_#, ACCESS) -a new
segment number has been assigned with the indicated access.
Load the appropriate register with the access, set the fault
bit and the software memory fault.
INNER_TC( 'LOAD', SEGMENT_#, ABS_ADD, BOUND) - a
segment has been loaded into memory, load the appropriate
addresses in the mapping register and reset the memory
software fault and fault bit if appropriate.
I NNERJEC ('UNLOAD', SEGMENT_#, WRITTEN) - the
segment is being removed from memory, set the memory
software fault and the fault bit and return the value of the
written bit.
INNER_TC( 'WRITTEN_3ITS', BITS) - an array
reflecting the value of the written bits is returned.
INNER_TC('GET_USED_3ITS', USED_BITS) - an array
reflecting the value of the used bits is returned.
INNER_TC( 'SET_USED_BITS', USED_BITS) -an array
is received reflecting the desired value of the used bits.
The inner traffic controller sets the used bits to the
desired values. The hypothesized hardware used bits are also
set by hardware whenever a segment is referenced.
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INNEE_TC( 'LOAD_MMU', LOC_EX_STATE, AES_ADD_MAP)
- a request to load a virtual processor with a new process
and create the memory management unit registers.
INNER_TC( 'UNLOAD_MMU', LOC_EX_STATE) - a request
to unload a virtual processor and save the execution state
in the indicated location.
INNER_TC('SET_SEG_EAULT', PROCESSED, SEGMENT_#)
- a request to set the software segment fault in the data
base (figure 14)
.
INNEP_TC( 'IDLE') - a request to load the idle
process and reduce the priority of the virtual processor to
the lowest possible.
INNER_TC( 'PRE_EMPT_INT', VIRT_PRO_ID) - a
request to generate a virtual pre_empt interupt to the
indicated virtual processor. The inner traffic controller
determines which physical processor the virtual processor is
in and sends an appropriate hardware interrupt to that
processor. If the virtual processor is in the wait state the
interupt is held pending until the virtual processor is put
in the ready state.
INNEE_TC( 'UNIDLE', 7I?.T_P30_ID) -a request to
unload the idle process, reinstate the loaded process and
restore the priority of the virtual processor.
The inner traffic controller is also invoiced by
the signal and wait. Signal and wait provide the
synchronization between the system processes and the user
processes. The inner traffic controller utilizes the signal
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and wait primitives to change the state of the virtual
processors and thereby control the multiplexing of the
virtual processors to the real processors, based on their
priorities .
5 . Non-Distributed Kernel
The non-distributed kernel consists of the system
processes. These processes have the characteristic that they
function asynchronous to each user process. The system
processes, as they are called, can reside in the local
memory of each processor but their shared data bases will
reside in global memory.
a. Memory Manager (System Process)
The memory manager process utilizes the Active
Segment Table (figure 9) as a data base. The portion of the
AST that contains system wide information will reside in
global memory. The portion of the AST that only relates to a
single processor can be distributed and will reside in local
memory.
The memory manager process is responsible for
two basic tasks: requests to brins* segments into memory and
requests to remove segments from memory. Other processes
task him by use of the signal and wait primitives. The
memory manager process has four tasks (entries): IN, OUT,
LOAD, and UNLOAD. The IN and OUT are requests to load and
remove a single segment. The LOAD and UNLOAD are requests to
load and unload a number of segments.
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The task to load a segment requires several
considerations. Is the segment currently active (AST entry)?
If it is, is it presently residing in global memory? If it
is not in global memory does the access of the added process
reauire that it be moved to global memory? How to alert the
processes with copies? The AST provides all the necessary
answers to render the proper decision as to where to load
the segment
.
At this time a better look: at the AST is called
for. It should be noted that every segment that presently
resides in memory is active and its address can be
determined from the AST. The virtual processor that it is in
can also be determined as well as the segment number by
which it is known within that virtual processor.
When a segment must be loaded into global memory
(based on user access) there is a need to notify processors
with a copy, of the segment, of the segments relocation.
After the segment has been loaded in global memory, the
memory manager process, tasked to load the segment, can
determine form the AST in which processors the segment is
presently loaded. These processors are sent
SIG-NAL('MEMORY_MANAGER', 'MOVE', UNIQUE_ID, ABS_ADD) where
ABS_ADR is the global address of the segment. Zach memory
manager process that receives the signal( 'move ' ) will check
his local AST to determine which processes have the segment
loaded and the segment number assigned and then CALL
INNER_TC( 'CHANGE_ADD', PROCESSED, SEGMENT.*, A3S_ADD) for
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each process that has the segment in local memory. The inner
traffic controller will update the mapping register to
reflect the new absolute address.
If a user requests access, and another user
already has write access, there is a need to get the current
copy moved to global memory. In this case the memory manager
process attempting to load the segment must
SIGNAL! 'MEMORY_MANAGER' , 'M0V2_IT" t UNIQUE_ID) and
WAITf PROCESS_ID, MSG). The processor with the current copy
of the segment was determined from the AST. The memory
manager process with the current copy, after receiving the
signaK 'move_it ' ) , will relocate the segment in global
memory, CALL INNER_TC ( 'CHAMGE_ADD ', PROCESSED, SEGMENT_#,
ABS_ADE) and SIGNAL( 'MEMORY_MANAGSR' , 'MCVEL', UNIQUS_ID,
ABS_ADD). It should be noted that there is some
synchronization required between the memory manager process
and the inner traffic controller to insure the segment had
not been written in during the time it took to move it and
change the address.
As segments are loaded and unloaded the AST is
updated appropriately. When a segment is removed from memory
if it has been written in the segment is copied baci to
secondary storage.
The AST also provides a method of notifying
processes of segment faults. If the memory manager process
(for each processor connected with a loaded connected
process) is notified when the access control list for a
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segment is changed by SIGNAL( 'MEMORY_MANAGER'
,
'SET_SEG_FAULT', UNIQUE_ID) then every loaded connected
process can be notified fey CALL INNER_TC ( 'SET_SEG_FAULT '
PROCESS_ID, SEGMENT_#). For processes that are not loaded,
the traffic controller is similarly called to set the
software segment fault (figure 13). This means that the
software segment fault will have to be set for connected
processes when a segment is removed from the AST.
b. I/O Manager
The I/O manager is responsible for the external
I/O. There could be more than one I/O manager process,
conceivably one for each external device? corresponding
kernel calls must be provided. For example there could be an
I/O manager that handles all the external I/O to and from
the user terminals. It is sufficent, at this point, to say
that the I/O manager exists and handles external I/C.
6. Follow On Work
It should be re-emphasized that this is a design
and not an implementation. Although the detail is left for
further work:, the design proposed forms a substantial basis
upon which an implementation can be realized. The system
process structure is provided for in the design? however,
the system processes have been treated lightly and require
additional work. The user interface (supervisor calls)
presented is by no means an exhaustive list and could use




The state of the art techniques and design methodology
used to design secure operating system for multiple mini and
maxi processors have been found applicable to the multiple
microprocessor environment. The principal conclusion is that
the operating system design in this thesis will make it
possible to more effectively use modern microprocessors than
has been possible in the past.
One question that is addressed concerns the operating
system's ability to scale. Systems now available can support
four or five microprocessors. Increasing that number of
microprocessors quickly brings serious degradation because
of the increased bus contention. The expected scaling factor
is much better for this design. The bus contention has been
significantly reduced - segmentation permits effectively
using local memory instead of arlobal memory.
This design supports a family of operating systems, not
just one designed for a specific application. Sub-sets of
this system can be constructed to provide the desired
functions because the design used a loop free structure.
Included family members range from a core resident tactical
system to a virtual memory time sharing system.
Configuration independence is supported in this design.
One or many physical processors can be added or subtracted
from the system without affecting the workability of the
35

system. Similarly memory can be added or subtracted.
Security has been designed into this system. It was not
added on as an afterthought. This design used a security
kernel based upon a mathematical model to insure the
security. A secure multilevel environment is provided by
this system.
Commercial devices will soon be widely available to
implement this operating system. The Zilog Z8000 series,
microprocessor, for example will provide the segmentation
and multiple domains necessary for an effective system. The
present data buses are compatible and when used with this
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